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Practical Methods for Measuring and Managing Operational Risk in the Financial 
Sector: A Clinical Study 
1. Introduction 
Since the first Basel Accord was adopted in 1988, the financial sector consistently 
complained about its simplistic approach based on the Cooke ratio for the determination of 
regulatory capital. The need for reorganizing the framework under which exposures to credit risk 
should be assessed was a major impetus for the revision of this system through the second Accord, 
or Basel II. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (hereafter the Basel Committee) seized 
this opportunity to extend the scope of its proposals by introducing explicit recommendations with 
regard to operational risk.1  
While the two simplest approaches proposed by Basel II (i.e., the Basic Indicator Approach, 
or BIA, and the Standardized Approach, or SA) define the operational risk capital of a bank as a 
fraction of its gross income, the Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) allows banks to develop 
their own model for assessing the regulatory capital that covers their yearly operational risk 
exposure within a confidence interval of 99.9% (henceforth, this exposure is called Operational 
Value at Risk, or OpVaR). Among the eligible variants of AMA, a statistical model widely used in 
the insurance sector and often referred to as the Loss Distribution Approach (LDA) has become a 
standard in the industry over the last few years. Yet, the implementation of a compliant LDA 
involves many sensitive modelling choices as well as practical measurement issues. The first 
objective of this paper is to develop a comprehensive LDA framework for the measurement of 
operational risk, and to address in a systematic fashion all the issues involved in its construction.  
As a consequence of their conceptual simplicity, BIA and SA models do not provide any 
insights into the drivers of operational risks, nor into the specific performance of the bank with 
respect to risk management. By contrast, the LDA model lends itself to quantifying the impact of 
active operational risk management actions, and justifying (potentially substantial) capital 
reductions. Unlike credit risk modelling, however, the cost-benefit trade-off of this alternative 
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approach is largely unknown to date. Therefore, the second major objective of this paper is to 
examine the costs and benefits associated with two distinct decisions, namely: the adoption of the 
LDA instead of the basic approaches on one hand, and the improvement of the operational risk 
management system on the other hand. We propose a RAROC-based framework for the analysis of 
the financial impact of various operational risk management decisions, where the distribution of 
losses is viewed as an input and cost variables as an output.  
To achieve the two objectives mentioned above, we face most of the practical issues 
encountered by a financial institution in a similar situation. Namely, in the process of implementing 
the LDA, the institution must, in turn, (i) infer the distribution of rare losses from an internal sample 
of observations of limited size, (ii) incorporate possibly heterogeneous external loss data into its 
estimation, and (iii) account for dependence – or lack thereof – between individual series of losses. 
Furthermore, the economic analysis of the operational risk management system requires (iv) 
assessing the impact of managerial actions on the distribution of losses, and finally (v) mapping this 
loss exposure into an economically meaningful cost function.  
The last two issues (iv)-(v) in the above list have apparently not been handled in the 
literature and require an original investigation. For this purpose, using analogies with credit risk and 
market risk modelling, we introduce a measure of risk-adjusted return (RAROC) on operational 
capital and perform a sensitivity analysis based on models developed in the LDA implementation. 
By contrast, the first three issues (i)-(iii) in the above list have been previously identified and 
separately addressed in the financial risk management literature. For instance, Embrechts, 
Klüppelberg and Mikosch (1997) recommend the use of Extreme Value Theory (EVT) to model the 
tail of the distribution in risk management, and so do King (2002), Moscadelli (2004), Cruz (2004) 
or Chavez-Demoulin, Embrechts and Neslehova (2006). Frachot and Roncalli (2002) and Baud et 
al. (2002) both address the incorporation of external losses in the internal dataset. Applications of 
copulas to model dependence between financial risks have been reported in the field of market risk, 
credit risk, insurance or overall risk management, but very few applications seem to have been 
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performed in the context of operational risk (for an example, see Di Clemente and Romano (2004) 
or Chavez-Demoulin, Embrechts and Neslehova (2006)). Even so, however, our claim is that these 
issues cannot be considered as satisfactorily solved from the point of view of operational risk 
practitioners, since either they have been investigated in a purely theoretical framework 
(disregarding the inevitable hurdles encountered in any real-world implementation), or, in the best 
case, they have been addressed as separate and disconnected issues only. As a consequence, 
methodological gaps remain to be filled in order to link different components of the approach, and 
practitioners are often at loss when confronted with the formidable task of developing a complete 
operational risk measurement system based on the LDA. 
Our work can be seen as an attempt at overcoming these shortcomings. In the empirical part 
of our paper, we opt for a clinical case study that encompasses all components of the discussion in a 
single framework based on real operational loss data collected by a European bank. This 
methodological choice enables us to adopt the realistic point of view of the risk manager of a 
specific financial institution. To our knowledge, no published application adopts a similar 
perspective. The closest work in this respect is a study by Chavez-Demoulin, Embrechts and 
Neslehova (2006) in which the authors focus on individual statistical modelling issues and illustrate 
them using transformed operational risk data, a framework which prevents them from discussing the 
underlying practical issues in great detail. Other related investigations are reported by Fontnouvelle, 
Jordan and Rosengren (2003), who rely on a public operational loss database (which is not 
exhaustive and restricted to large losses), and by Moscadelli (2004), who uses loss data gathered 
during the 2002 Loss Data Collection Exercise carried out by the Basel Committee. The paper by Di 
Clemente and Romano (2004) performs its analysis on catastrophe insurance data.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 and 3, we discuss the modelling choices 
underlying the measurement and management of operational risk capital, respectively. Section 4 
tests the risk measurement methodology on real data, and assesses the impact of operational risk 
management on the profitability of the bank. Finally, Section 5 presents some conclusions. 
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2. Measuring operational risk 
2.1. Overview 
Although the application of AMA is in principle open to any proprietary model, the most 
popular methodology is by far the Loss Distribution Approach (LDA), a parametric technique that 
consists in separately estimating a frequency distribution for the occurrence of operational losses 
and a severity distribution for the economic impact of individual losses. In order to obtain the total 
distribution of operational losses, these two distributions are then combined through n-convolution 
of the severity distribution with itself, where n is a random variable that follows the frequency 
distribution (see Frachot et al., 2001, for details). 
In addition to processing homogeneous categories of internal observations to produce 
univariate distributions of operational losses for a single type of loss event, the LDA methodology 
must include two additional steps dealing with different technical issues, namely: integrating 
external loss data in order to refine the fit of the extreme tail of the distribution; and jointly 
analyzing the loss event categories, so as to adjust the aggregate distribution for possible 
dependence between the univariate distributions.2 Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 respectively describe our 
implementation of each of these three steps. 
The output of the LDA methodology is a full characterization of the distribution of annual 
operational losses of the bank. This loss distribution contains all relevant information for the 
computation of the regulatory capital charge – defined as the difference between the 99.9% 
percentile and the expected value of the distribution – as well as necessary inputs for the assessment 
of the efficiency of operational risk management procedures. 
2.2. Processing of internal data 
In this section, we discuss the methodological treatment of a series of internal loss data for a single 
category of risk events in order to construct a complete probability distribution of these losses. 
The frequency distribution models the occurrence of operational loss events within the bank. 
Such a distribution is by definition discrete and, for short periods of time, the frequency of losses is 
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often modelled either by a homogenous Poisson or by a (negative) binomial distribution. The choice 
between these distributions is important as the intensity parameter is deterministic in the first case 
and stochastic in the second (see Embrechts, Furrer and Kaufmann, 2003).  
When modelling the severity of losses, on the other hand, our preliminary tests3 indicate that 
classical distributions are unable to fit the entire range of observations in a realistic manner. A study 
by Fontnouvelle et al. (2004) independently reaches similar conclusions. Hence, as in King (2001), 
Alexander (2003) or Fontnouvelle et al. (2004), we propose to distinguish between ordinary (i.e., 
high frequency/low impact) and large (i.e., low frequency/high impact) losses originating, in our 
view, from two different generating processes. The “ordinary distribution” includes all losses in a 
limited range denoted [L;U] (L being the collection threshold used by the bank), while the “extreme 
distribution” generates all the losses above the cut-off threshold U. We then define the severity 
distribution as a mixture of the corresponding mutually exclusive distributions.4  
2.2.1. Severity distribution – ordinary losses 
The distribution of ordinary losses can be modelled by a strictly positive continuous 
distribution such as the Exponential, Weibull, Gamma or Lognormal distribution. More precisely, 
let f(x;θ) be the chosen parametric density function, where θ denotes the vector of parameters, and 
let F(x;θ) be the cumulative distribution function (cdf) associated with f(x;θ). Then, the density 




xfxf −=  The 
corresponding log-likelihood function is 
















θθl     (1) 
where (x1,…,xN) is the sample of observed ordinary losses. It should be maximized in order to 
estimate θ. 
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2.2.2. Severity distribution – large losses 
Small-sized samples containing few – if any – exceptional, very severe losses represent a 
common issue when dealing with operational losses in banks (see Embrechts et al., 2003). When 
applied to such samples, classical maximum likelihood methods tend to yield distributions that are 
not sufficiently heavy-tailed to reflect the probability of occurrence of exceptional losses. To resolve 
this issue, we rely on concepts and methods from Extreme Value Theory (EVT), and more 
specifically on the Peak Over Threshold (POT) approach. This approach will enable us to 
simultaneously determine the cut-off threshold U and to calibrate a distribution for extreme losses 
using all the observations above this threshold. 
The procedure builds upon results of Balkema and de Haan (1974) and Pickands (1975) 
which state that, for a broad class of distributions, the values of the random variables above a 
sufficiently high threshold U follow a Generalized Pareto Distribution (GPD) with parameters ξ (the 
shape index, or tail parameter), β (the scale index) and U (the location index). The GPD can thus be 
thought of as the conditional distribution of X given X > U (see Embrechts et al., 1997, for a 









⎛ −+−= UxUxF  .    (2) 
While several authors (see e.g. Drees and Kaufmann, 1998, Dupuis, 1999, Matthys and 
Beirlant, 2003) have suggested methods to identify the cut-off threshold, no single approach has 
become widely accepted, yet. A standard technique is based on the visual inspection of the Mean 
Excess Function Plot (see Embrechts et al., 1997, for details). We replace this graphical tool by an 
algorithmic procedure that builds on ideas from Huisman et al. (2001) and shares some similarities 
with a procedure used by Longin and Solnik (2001) in a different context. The steps are: 
1. Let (x1,…,xn) be the ordered sample of observations. Consider m candidate thresholds U1,…,Um 
such that xn-i,…,xn > Ui for i=1,…,m. 
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2. For each threshold Ui, use the weighted average of Hill estimators proposed by Huisman et al. 
(2001) to estimate the tail index ξi of the GPD distribution.  
3. Compute the maximum likelihood estimator of the scale parameter βi of the GPD, with the tail 
index ξi fixed to the value obtained in step 2. 











where ni is the number of losses above threshold Ui, Fk is the cdf of the GPD(ξk,βk, μ k) and  
is the empirical cdf of the excesses. 
kFˆ
5. Identify MSE(Uopt) = min(MSE(U1),…,MSE(Um));  is retained as estimator of the cut-off 
threshold and the excesses are assumed to follow a 
Uˆ
( )UGPD ˆ,ˆ,ˆ βξ  distribution. 
Note in particular that the method proposed in Step 2 corrects for the small-sample bias of the 
original Hill estimator. As the robustness of maximum likelihood estimators might be questioned 
when working with very small dataset, we prefer to rely on this modified Hill estimator to fully 
benefit from the information contained in the whole dataset. As a consequence, however, the 
estimation of the tail and scale parameters requires two successive steps (namely, Steps 2 and 3). 
2.3. Processing of external data 
In order to comply with Basel II, the AMA ought to specify a proper way to integrate 
external loss data into the capital charge calculation using one of the following three methods:  
• integrating external data in the internal loss database to increase the number of observations;  
• separately estimating the operational risk profile of internal and external database and 
combining them by Bayesian techniques (see Chapter 7 in Alexander, 2003);  
• providing additional examples and descriptions of real large loss events to illustrate “what if” 
scenarios and to allow the self-assessment of extreme risks. 
In this study, we illustrate a possible implementation of the first option. Keeping in line with 
the recommendations of the Basel Committee (2004), we use an external dataset of very large losses 
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in order to improve the accuracy of the tail of the severity distribution6. (Note that, by contrast, 
Frachot et al., 2002, create an enlarged sample containing a mix of internal and external data that 
cover losses of all sizes).  
As observed by Frachot and Roncalli (2002) and Baud et al. (2002), integrating external data 
in the internal loss database raises major methodological questions, including the determination of 
an appropriate scaling technique which allows to account for the size of the bank (see also Shih et 
al., 2000, Hartung, 2003). To scale the external severity data, we follow the approach of Shih et al. 
(2000) and we accordingly posit the non-linear relationship:  
,rSLoss a=       (3) 
where Loss is the magnitude of the loss, S is a proxy for the firm size (its gross income, in our 
implementation7), a is a scaling factor, and r is the multiplicative residual term not explained by any 
fluctuations in size.  Note that if a = 0, the severity of the losses is not related to the size of the 
institution. If a = 1, this relation is assumed to be linear.  











)ln(        (i = 1,…p)    (4) 
where (Lossi,Si), i = 1,…p, are the external observations. This model can be estimated by OLS. 











⎛= ,     (5) 
where  is the size of the internal business segment corresponding to observation i.  intS
By applying the same scaling coefficient a to the collection threshold of the external 
database, we obtain the threshold E from which the tail of the distribution of internal data is 
replaced by the calibrated distribution of external data. Finally, a parametric distribution on [E,+∝) 
can be fitted to the sample of scaled loss data. This will be illustrated in Section 4.2.5 hereunder. 
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We end up with a distribution of loss severity consisting of three distinct parts, associated 
respectively with ordinary losses, large losses and extreme losses (see Figure 1). In a simulation 
framework, this distribution can be sampled by weighing each part of the distribution according to 
the relative occurrence of each type of losses in the internal loss database. 
Insert Figure 1 approximately here 
2.4. Dealing with all business lines and event types  
The methodology outlined in Sections 2.2-2.3 is applicable to a homogeneous category of 
operational loss data. In contrast, however, Basel II requires taking into consideration 56 categories 
of risks, corresponding to 8 business lines and 7 loss events types. For this purpose, the Accord 
proposes to compute the total capital charge by simple addition of the capital charges for all 56 risk 
categories, thus implicitly assuming perfect positive dependence between risks. Banks are 
nevertheless offered the possibility to account for dependence by appropriate techniques.  
Dependence between risks can be modelled either between frequencies of loss events, or 
between their severities, or between aggregate annual losses. Frachot et al. (2004) argue 
convincingly that “the correlation considered by the Basel Committee is unambiguously the 
aggregate loss correlation” and that it can be expected to be rather weak in general. They also 
explain that this dependence can be adequately captured in the LDA framework by the frequency 
correlations, not by severity correlations (see Frachot et al., 2003, for a discussion of this topic).  
We directly model the dependence of aggregate losses through the use of copulas (see e.g. 
Genest and McKay, 1986, or Nelsen, 1999 for an overview) in order to combine the marginal 
distributions of different risk categories into a single joint distribution. This method possesses more 
attractive theoretical properties than traditional linear correlation when dealing with non-elliptical 
distributions, such as those encountered in operational risk modelling. 
If Fi(xi) denotes the marginal cdf of aggregate losses for cell i (i = 1,…, p) of the (business 
line×risk type) matrix, then we represent the joint distribution of aggregate losses as 
 where C is an appropriate copula. We report here results  ,))x(F ),...,x(FC(   ), x,x(F 5611561 =…
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obtained with a mixture copula combining the default Basel II assumption of perfect dependence 
between risks (corresponding to the upper Fréchet bound) with a much less conservative view, 
namely, independence between risks.  
In its bivariate form, the mixture copula used in this study can be expressed as 
( ) ( ) ( )vuCvuCC ,,1 +⊥ ⋅+⋅−= θθθ     (6) 
where θ is the Spearman rank correlation coefficient which is assumed to be positive; un is the cdf 








+ denotes the full dependence, or upper Fréchet bound, copula defined as 
. It is often referred to as the linear Spearman copula and is similar to 
family B11 in Joe (1997) (see e.g. Hürlimann, 2004a,b, for applications to insurance problems).
( Nn uuuC ,...,,...,min 1=+ )
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3. Managing operational risk  
Operational risk management involves an array of methods and approaches that essentially 
serve two purposes: reduction of average losses and avoidance of catastrophic losses. Some of these 
techniques aim at reducing the magnitude of losses, some at avoiding loss events, some at both.  
Table 1 reviews a number of illustrative management actions and three different possible 
types of impact on the parameters of the loss distributions, either in frequency or in severity: 
reduction in the number of large losses, reduction in the frequency of all losses, or reduction in the 
severity of all losses. The business lines or event types impacted depend on the action taken.  
Insert Table 1 approximately here 
3.1. Mapping of the distribution of losses on profitability 
Our methodology produces the necessary tools to estimate the quantitative impact of various 
risk management actions on the risk-adjusted return of activities, and, in turn, their consequence on 
the tariffs applicable to financial products. 
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Remember that RAROC, the Risk Adjusted Return on Capital, is a performance measure that 
expresses the return of an investment, adjusted for its risk and related to the economic capital 
consumed when undertaking this investment. The general formula for RAROC writes:  
CapitalEconomic
LossesExpectedvenuesReRAROC −=     (7) 
The adjustment for risk takes place both in the numerator and the denominator of the ratio.  
Until recently, the RAROC performance measure had been mostly used to assess the credit 
activities of banks. Since the Basel Accord introduces regulatory capital for operational risks, banks 
could start considering introducing risk-adjusted pricing of activities that are particularly exposed to 
operational risk and developing an analogous RAROC approach to operational risk. In order to 
obtain a proper RAROC measurement adapted to operational risk, we must identify (i) expected 
losses due to operational events; (ii) economic capital necessary to cover the unexpected operational 
losses; and (iii) revenues generated by taking operational risks. 
The first two inputs are readily derived from our methodology, as the fitted distribution of 
operational losses provides both the expected aggregate loss and the percentile for the regulatory 
99.9% OpVaR used to determine regulatory capital. The estimation of the revenues associated with 
operational risks represents a more complex challenge. Unlike credit risk whose counterpart in 
revenues can be clearly identified, we face here the fundamental question of the existence of 
operational revenues as counterpart of operational risks. Strictly speaking, operational revenues are 
null. We plead for a less restrictive view, though, since even pure market or credit activities, and a 
fortiori those that generate other types of revenues like the fee business (asset management, private 
banking, custody, payments and transaction) involve large components of business and operational 
risks that call for compensation through an adequate tariff policy. A proportion of the bank revenues 
are generated by operations and are, as such, a counterpart for operational risk. Along the same line 
of reasoning, banks are willing to apply a mark-up to the price of their operations, in order to get a 
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proper remuneration for the operational risk they generate by doing business. As a first 
approximation, this mark-up is equal to the gross operating margin of the financial institution.  






opop −=     (8) 
Here, GIop(i) = λi × GI(i) where GI(i) is the Gross Income of business line i and λi is the mark-up for 
operational risks charged by business line i (equal to its gross operating margin). The choice of a 
multiplier of gross income is justified by the evolution of financial institutions towards an 
adaptation of their tariffs in consideration with the Basel II Accord.  
The formulation in equation (8) allows us to perform two kinds of economic analyses: first, 
we can directly quantify the impact of a given management action on the RAROCO, generated by 
the reduction of EL and the subsequent variation of economic capital following better risk 
management. Second, the specification of a target value for the RAROCO induces estimates of the 
maximum acceptable cost of a given action through the variation of the necessary level of revenues 
to maintain the target RAROCO.  
 
4. Empirical analysis  
4.1. Data 
The methodology outlined in Sections 2 and 3 has been applied to real operational loss data 
provided by a large European bank. Data collection has been performed in compliance with the 
Basel II definition of business lines and event types, but the available data set is still incomplete and 
unsatisfactory in some respects. Therefore, and since our main purpose is to illustrate a 
methodology (and not to analyze the exact situation of a specific institution), we focus our analysis 
on a sub-matrix consisting of two rows and two columns of the original (business lines × loss event) 
matrix. The selected business lines are “Asset management” and “Retail banking”, while the loss 
event types are “Clients, products & business practices” and “Execution, delivery & process 
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management”. For the sake of data confidentiality, we have multiplied all loss amounts by a 
constant and we have adjusted the time frame of data collection so as to obtain a total of 5,000 loss 
events.9 Summary statistics are given in Table 2. 
Our external data set is the OpVar Loss Database provided by Fitch Risks. It consists of 
publicly released operational losses above USD 1 million collected by the vendor. We have filtered 
the database to remove losses arising from drastically different geographical regions and/or 
activities. Moreover, in order to allow scaling (see Section 2.3), we keep losses only from those 
banks whose gross income is available in the database. The summary statistics of external losses are 
provided in Table 2. 
Insert Table 2 approximately here 
4.2. Calibration of LDA 
4.2.1. Frequency distribution 
We illustrate the computation of the Operational Value-at-Risk (OpVaR) for the cell “Asset 
Management / Execution, process and delivery management” (henceforth Cell (1,2)). 
The variance of the monthly frequency series is higher than its mean, suggesting that a 
negative binomial distribution might be more appropriate than a Poisson process. This is confirmed 
by Table 3, which displays some classical goodness-of-fit measures that all favour the negative 
binomial distribution against the Poisson distribution.   
Insert Table 3 approximately here 
For Cell(1,2), the fitted frequency distribution is a Negative Binomial (645, 0.459). 
4.2.2. Internal data 
Applying the algorithm developed in section 2.2.3, the weighted average of Hill estimators proposed 
by Huisman et al. (2001) is ξ = 1.412. The subsequent steps of this algorithm yield the optimal cut-
off threshold U = 537 (64 loss events exceed this threshold). Using a constrained Maximum 
Likelihood approach to estimate the remaining parameter of the GPD, we obtain β = 994.2. Thus we 
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conclude that the extreme losses of the sample (above the threshold U = 537) are modelled by a 
GPD with tail index ξ = 1.412, scale index β = 994.2 and location index U = 537. 
Insert Table 4 approximately here 
To fit the distribution of the “ordinary” losses (smaller than U = 537), we calibrate five 
distributions10 (Exponential, Pareto, Weibull, Lognormal and Gamma) by maximizing the log-
likelihood expression in equation (1). A summary of the different fitting exercises is given in Table 
4. In each case, we report the Mean Squared Error and Anderson-Darling goodness-of-fit indicators 
(adapted to account for the truncation of the distributions). The Weibull distribution with parameters 
a= 4.42 and b= 0.094 provides the best fit for this specific cell.  
4.2.3. Measurement for the complete matrix 
A similar methodology has been used for the other three cells of the matrix. Table 5 summarizes the 
corresponding results. If the operations of the bank were limited to these four cells, Table 6 would 
directly provide the total required capital charge for operational risk under the assumption of perfect 
dependence between the cells of the matrix and without inclusion of external data. 
Insert Table 5 approximately here 
Based on the default assumption of Basel II, we simply need to aggregate the OpVaR in excess of 
Expected Losses to get the overall capital charge. Table 6 indicates that the total capital charge 
(estimated by Monte Carlo simulation) amounts to: 
19.29 million (OpVaR99.9) – 3.12 million (Expected Loss) = 16.17 million.11
Insert Table 6 approximately here 
4.2.4. Dependence 
We now turn to the explicit introduction of a dependence structure among risks. With a 
sample of limited extent, one can only perform reliable inference about dependence by analyzing 
weekly or monthly observations. However, in order to carry out the OpVaR calculations, we would 
really need to identify the dependence structure between aggregated yearly losses. In order to work 
around this difficulty, we make the following observation: under the i.i.d. assumption for monthly 
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losses relating to a single class of risk (i.e., for an individual cell of the loss matrix), there does not 
exist any non-contemporaneous dependence between observations relating to different classes of 
risks (i.e., to different cells), and the observed dependence structure at the monthly level can simply 
be transposed at the yearly level.12 To assess whether this transposition can actually be performed, 
we have run a Vector AutoRegressive (VAR) analysis on the monthly aggregated losses. Our results 
indicate that almost no coefficient is significant at the usual confidence level. Therefore, we use the 
monthly dependence structure in our annual simulations.  
Insert Table 7 approximately here 
Table 7 displays the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients13 between monthly aggregate 
losses of the four cells. The relatively low values of these coefficients confirm that the perfect 
positive dependence assumption appears unduly strong. Taking the “real” dependence structure into 
account would lead to more accurate results and possibly lower the total required capital charge (as 
predicted by Frachot et al., 2004). 
Due to data availability reasons, some banks might not be able to calibrate the copulas 
modelling the dependence structure between individual cells. A solution to this problem is to 
concentrate instead on the dependence between business lines, conservatively assuming perfect 
positive dependence between loss event types. To assess the impact of such an assumption, Table 8 
also provides estimations obtained when using “real” dependence between business lines only. 
Spearman’s correlation coefficient between the aggregate losses of the two business lines under 
consideration is equal to 0.042. As this value is also the weight associated with the upper Fréchet 
copula (corresponding to perfect dependence) in Equation (6), this result clearly indicates that the 
default assumption of Basel II is far from being observed in this clinical study. 
Table 8 displays the OpVaR values and the capital charges reported under various 
dependence assumptions when using the linear Spearman copula to introduce dependence in our 
Monte Carlo simulations.14 Parameters of the copulas are estimated through a Maximum Likelihood 
approach and the Monte Carlo experiments are based on a procedure described in Nelsen (1999). As 
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in the full dependence case, we simulate 20,000 years of losses to obtain the annual aggregated loss 
distribution for the bank. 
Insert Table 8 approximately here 
The capital charge obtained with the SA is low when compared to the default AMA, mostly 
due to the nature of our dataset.15 Taking partial dependence into account substantially reduces the 
required capital charge with respect to the default AMA, by a factor of about 30%. This is consistent 
with results reported in the literature (for instance, Frachot et al. (2001) report potential reductions 
of 38% for the capital charge while Chavez et al. (2006) observe a decline of slightly more than 
40% when comparing full independence with perfect dependence on a 3-business lines example). In 
this study, if the costs associated with the adoption of an advanced measurement approach (IT 
systems to collect, store and handle data, training costs for staff, potential need for skilled resources 
to maintain the model, etc.) represent less than 38% of the capital charge under SA, it may be 
worthwhile adopting the AMA on an own funds requirements basis. 
4.2.5. External data 
To illustrate a possible way to integrate external data in the internal database, we scale the 
external data described in Table 2 by the procedure of Shih et al. (2000), as explained in Section 2.3. 
The estimation of equation (4) by OLS regression yields an estimate of the scaling factor a = 0.154 
for the external data of Cell (1, 2), which is in line with the findings in Shih et al. (2000) of a highly 
nonlinear relationship between losses and size. Then we scale the external data accordingly and 
estimate the distribution of the resulting data. Using the same parametric distributions as in Section 
4.2.1, a lognormal distribution (12.37; 1.57) provides the best fit. The rescaled threshold for external 
losses is E = 21,170.  
Next, we can compute the aggregate loss distribution based on a severity distribution that 
combines three elements: a distribution for the body of the data (“high frequency/low severity” 
events), the GPD distribution for large losses and the external data distribution for extremely large 
losses. In order to assess the impact of the introduction of external data on the estimates of the high 
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percentiles of the aggregate loss distribution and of the regulatory capital, Table 9 provides a 
comparison between results obtained with or without external data.  
Insert Table 9 approximately here 
Replacing EVT estimates of the GPD parameters for the very far end of the severity 
distribution by the fitted distribution of comparable external observations alters the aggregate loss 
distribution. The mean loss increases with the inclusion of external data, while the tail appears to be 
thinner. Thus, adding external data results in a more dense distribution of aggregated losses. 
To check the robustness of these results, we report confidence intervals for our estimates 
derived from a bootstrap analysis. We randomly extract from our internal data a sub-sample 
containing 90% of the original loss events. Then we estimate the severity distribution of this sub-
sample (both the “body” and the “tail” parameters) following the methodology described in Section 
2. Finally we derive the aggregated loss distribution (using the same frequency distribution in all 
cases) and compute the statistics of interest. This process is repeated 250 times. Figures 2a and 2b 
display the graphical evolution of the confidence intervals. 
Insert Figures 2a and 2b approximately here 
For the higher quantiles, the confidence intervals have similar sizes for both approaches. 
However, for smaller quantiles, the confidence interval tends to be narrower and the median 
estimate is in general closer to the lower bound of the interval when no external data is used. 
Apparently, the use of EVT to fit the tail of the loss distribution results in a right-skewed 
distribution of the quantile estimates. 
4.3. Impact of ORM on the RAROC  
4.3.1. Determination of the Operational RAROC 
The quantitative analysis described in the previous sections provides two out of the three 
data elements needed to calculate the Operational RAROC (RAROCO), namely, the Expected Loss 
and the Economic Capital; see Equation (8). The third element, i.e., revenues can be estimated 
according to two approaches discussed below.  
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The first approach is to consider that a proportion of the bank revenues are generated by 
operations and are, as such, a counterpart to operational risk. For the sake of illustration, we 
calculate the RAROCO of each of the two business lines according to this view. To quantify the 
“operational revenues”, we assume that the ratio between expected operational losses and 
operational revenues is similar to the average cost/revenue ratio in the business line, i.e., the gross 
operating margin. Our dataset displays an average gross operating margin of 14.0% over the last 
years for the retail segment, which includes both retail banking and asset management.  
The second option is to assess the minimum level of revenue needed in a business line to 
reach a RAROCO threshold. A common RAROC threshold in the banking industry is 18%, which 
roughly corresponds to 12% of net ROE, after taking into account tax deductibility since RAROC is 
a gross return measure. This enables us to compute the minimum compensation level of income 
which is necessary for the different business lines. More importantly, this view will allow 
computing the maximum acceptable cost for risk management actions, as detailed in the next sub-
section. Results are displayed in Table 10  
Insert Table 10 approximately here 
Note that the RAROCO values are very low (less than 3.5% with the default AMA). This 
result indicates that the operational risk-reward relationship does not yield a profitable rate of return 
for the bank, i.e. it can be seen as a cost center if the bank charges the same gross margin as for the 
other activities. Nevertheless, the differential results obtained with managerial actions will indicate 
to what extent they are likely to increase the bank’s profitability. 
For both measures, the correction for dependence in the RAROC displays a great 
improvement over the full dependence case by showing an increase of more than 50% in risk-
adjusted return on capital. 
4.3.2. Comparative analysis of different risk mitigating actions  
We analyze the impact of risk mitigating actions on profitability by comparing the first two 
actions described in Table 1. For “Dashboards”, the expected frequency of events is proportionally 
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reduced across all business lines and loss event types while with “Audit Tracking”, the expected 
frequency and the magnitude of the severity are simultaneously reduced in all business lines for one 
specific loss event type.  
We assume the bank’s management has set the following objectives: (i) to reach a target 
RAROCO of 18%, and (ii) to reduce the Expected Loss (EL) by 15% for strategic purposes. The risk 
manager should select the most attractive solution through a cost-benefit analysis.  
To solve this problem, we first assess the performance (i.e., the necessary reductions in 
frequency x and severity y) required for each action in order to reach a 15% reduction of the EL. 
Next, we combine these performance requirements with the constraint on the target RAROCO to 
measure the maximum acceptable cost for each action. Table 11 summarizes the impact of the 
various risk management actions on the inputs of the bank’s profitability.   
Insert Table 11 approximately here 
Note that different actions, while leading to the same reduction of the expected losses, have 
different impacts on the unexpected loss and thus on the regulatory capital. Data show that actions 
targeting Cell (2,2) “Retail banking / Execution, delivery & process management” have the greatest 
impact on EL. By contrast, Cell (1,2) “Asset management / Execution, delivery & process 
management” is least impacted by risk management actions.  
Overall, the impact on regulatory capital seems to be influenced by two factors: the cell 
where the effort is targeted, with a dominant impact of Cell (2,2), and the relative focus on severity. 
From Table 5, Cell (1,2) displays the largest proportion of “Large” internal losses. Thus, any 
managerial action addressing this cell results in a greater effect on the tail of the distribution.  
On the other hand, the variation in unexpected loss, and thus the impact on the regulatory 
capital, is connected to the relative weight of changes in frequency and severity of losses. For any 
given cell, a shift from a reduction of frequency of losses to a decrease in severity induces a further 
reduction in regulatory capital.  
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Table 12 provides an overview of the major results ensuing from a successful 
implementation of these actions. The “Acceptable Cost” column indicates the percentage of income 
that can be spent to implement the risk management action while maintaining the same RAROCO 
level for the activity. 
Insert Table 12 approximately here 
In all cases, by reducing the EL and the Economic Capital, operational risk management 
measures improve the RAROCO performance of the business lines to a significant extent. The 
RAROCO doubles (for dashboards) and almost triples (for audit tracking actions) after completion 
of the management actions.  
The objective of loss reduction subject to the profitability constraint is achieved if the 
performance requirements on frequency and severity described above are met. A cost-benefit 
analysis is needed to ensure that the costs associated with their implementation do not exceed the 
benefits that they carry. Accordingly, Table 12 reads as follows: if the costs linked to an “Audit 
tracking” plan allowing a reduction of 12% of the number of losses per year and a 5% reduction of 
their severity (see Table 10) represent less than 0.98% of the cumulated Gross Income of the two 
business lines, then the management’s objectives (15% reduction of Expected Loss and a target 
RAROCO of 18%) are met. 
Our approach permits to compare acceptable costs between different managerial actions. In 
our case, thanks to its better impact on economic capital reduction, cost incurred by the 
implementation of “Audit Tracking” action can be substantially greater than for “Dashboards” while 
still meeting the managerial wishes described above.  
 
5. Concluding remarks  
In this paper, we have attempted to explicitly and consistently address several major issues 
triggered by the emergence of operational risk coverage in the scope of the Basel II Accord. The 
first part of the paper is rooted in the observation of a significant gap between theoretical 
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quantitative approaches in the academic literature and the somewhat pragmatic approaches to 
modelling of operational losses adopted in the banking industry. We believe that this gap is due to 
the practical difficulties met in the implementation of advanced theoretical models. Thus, a first 
objective of our work was to suggest and implement a complete methodological framework to 
overcome these difficulties, whose various steps have been illustrated on a realistic case-study.  
As for the next research question, namely the cost-benefit analysis of adopting the AMA 
instead of a less sophisticated method, two major conclusions can be drawn. First, the behaviour of 
extremely large losses collected in external databases, as well as the dependence structure of 
operational losses among business lines and/or event types, are both likely to affect the cost-saving 
properties of the AMA choice in a significant way. A proper treatment of external data allows 
refining the analysis of the tail of the aggregate loss distribution. Furthermore, since the AMA aims 
at capturing rare events, it tends to be overly conservative when the basic assumption of additive 
capital charges (perfect correlation) is adopted. The estimation of risk exposure is significantly 
reduced when dependence is taken into account in a reasonable way.  
Second, the differential capital charge between the Standardized Approach and the AMA, 
and thus the opportunity cost of adopting (or not) a complex operational risk management system, 
significantly hinges on the discretionary weight assigned to the business lines. Banks should not 
take capital reduction for granted when adopting well-calibrated AMA, as the choice of the SA may 
be attractive to some banks whose risk is greater than average, and unattractive to others. With this 
respect, our cost-benefit trade-off analysis of adopting a full-fledged operational risk management 
system has less normative content than methodological substance. On the basis of controlled 
scenarios, we document that managerial actions are likely to bring significant improvements on the 
risk-adjusted profitability of the institution. The arbitrage between different managerial actions is 
mostly tied to the distributional behavior of the aggregate loss for each business line and event type. 
This kind of analysis of the profit side of operational risk management should be matched with a 
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more industrial view on the cost-side of these types of actions, which is beyond the scope of the 
study. 
All aspects of this research could be extended in various ways provided more complete and 
robust databases would become available. For instance, the inclusion in the framework of “soft” 
elements such as experts’ opinion, or bank-specific business environment and internal control 
factors, remains a major methodological challenge.16 This very promising area will actually reach 
its full potential only when banks will have collected extensive operational data – both on loss 
events and on corrective devices – on a systematic basis for several years. 
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This graph reports the Operational Value-at-Risk (OpVaR) at various confidence level (Basel II 
requires OpVaR at 99.9%) when considering both internal and external data. The dotted lines 
indicate the lower and upper bound at 90% confidence interval.  
 
 
This graph reports the Operational Value-at-Risk (OpVaR) at various confidence level (Basel II 
requires OpVaR at 99.9%) when considering only internal data. The dotted lines indicate the lower 
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Figure 2b: OpVaR and Confidence Intervals 
Figure 2a: OpVaR and Confidence Intervals 
 
 
Type of action Description Impact on the distribution 
Dashboard Systematic reduction of events in BL 
“i”, event types “j,k,l” 
Minus x% in the number of events in Business Line “i”, for the event types 
“j,k,l”. 
Audit tracking  Application of audit recommendations 
in BL “i” 
Minus x% in the number of events in Business Lines “i”, minus y% in the 
severity of losses for “internal fraud” and “processing errors” 
Business line 
reorganization  
New product review process for all BL Minus x% in frequency and minus y% in severity for event types “clients, 
products and business practices”  
Lessons learned Analysis of largest losses in Business 
Line (BL) “i” 
Cut off the z top losses, all Business Lines 
 
Rapid reaction  Mitigation of severity of OR events Minus x% in severity, all BL and all event types 
Business Continuity 
Plan 
Avoidance of events that may cause 
severe disruptions 
Minus x% in severity for event types of business disruption and system failure 
(if non existent in the original distribution) 
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 Table 2: Summary statistics for the operational loss database 
 
 Asset Management Retail Banking 
 CP&BP ED&PM CP&BP ED&PM 
 Cell (1,1) Cell (1,2) Cell (2,1) Cell (2,2) 
External Data 
(scaled) 
No. Obs. 238 712 764 3,286 224 
Median loss 195 30 25 20 183,484 
Mean loss 2,923 1,113 364 123 1,347,859 
Std. Dev. 23,034 10,325 1,958 929 4,530,245 
Total loss 695,570 792,350 278,147 403,235 301,920,406 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics of the four “Business Line” / “Loss Event Type” 
combinations considered in this paper. All statistics are expressed in transformed units. The 
“Internal” columns refer to the statistics of the internal operational risk loss database used in this 
study (net of recovery) while the “External” column relates to the (filtered) database of large 
publicly released external loss events. 
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Table 3: Calibration of the frequency distribution for Cell (1, 2) 
 
Distribution Poisson Negative Binomial 
Parameter 1 712 660 
Parameter 2 - 0.476 
Log-likelihood -223.8 -165.8 
CVM 1.058 0.650 
KS 0.296 0.234 
 
This table contains the estimated parameters of the frequency distribution for Cell(1,2) (“Asset 
Management” / “Execution, Delivery & Process Management”). All parameters are estimated 
using the Maximum Likelihood method. CVM refers to the Cramer – von Mises goodness-of-fit 
test while KS refers to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit statistic. 
 
 33
Table 4: Calibration of the severity distributions for Cell (1,2) 
 
 “Ordinary Losses”  “Extreme Losses” 
Distribution Exponential Pareto Weibull Lognormal Gamma  GPD 
Parameter 1 0.019 6.79 4.416 0.0000 0.00008  1.412 
Parameter 2 - 0.498 0.094 2.767 0.0057  994 
Parameter 3 - - - - -  537 
MSE 0.03334 0.00009 0.00007 0.00009 0.00425  0.0006 
AD 103.76 0.609 0.402 0.578 12.49  - 
 
This table contains the estimated parameters for Cell(1,2) (“Asset Management” / “Execution, 
Delivery & Process Management”) for the body and for the tail parts of the severity distribution. 
All parameters are estimated using Maximum Likelihood method, except Parameters 1 and 3 of 
the GPD (ξ and U, respectively) which are obtained applying the algorithm described in Section 
2.2. MSE refers to the Mean Square Error while AD refers to the Anderson-Darling goodness-of-
fit statistic. 
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Table 5: Calibration of the fitted distributions  
 
 Business Line & Event Type 
 Cell (1,1) Cell (1,2) Cell (2,1) Cell (2,2) 
Frequency     
Distribution Neg.Bin. Neg.Bin. Neg.Bin. Neg.Bin. 
K 191 660 654 3,070 
P 0.431 0.476 0.459 0.482 
“Ordinary” losses     
Distribution Pareto Weibull Weibull Lognormal 
Parameter 1 6.79 4.42 2.92 0.786 
Parameter 2 0.157 0.094 0.119 2.044 
“Large” losses     
% above U 8.9 % 9.0 % 5.0 % 1.5 % 
GPD 1 (ξ) 1.05 1.416 1.113 1.101 
GPD 2 (β) 3002.5 994.2 1437.5 1464.6 
GPD 3 (U) 4076 537 1034 950 
 
This table contains the estimated parameters for frequency and severity distributions of the four 
considered cells. Parameters for the frequency distribution and for distribution fitting “ordinary” 
losses are obtained with MLE. “Large” losses are modelled with a GPD whose parameters are 




Table 6: Regulatory capital under perfect dependence 
 
 Business Line & Event Type 
 Cell (1,1) Cell (1,2) Cell (2,1) Cell (2,2) 
Total 
Real total loss 695,570 792,350 278,147 403,235 2,169,302 
Median simulated loss 476,601 884,729 407,469 470,921 2,239,720 
Mean simulated loss (a) 654,329 1,244,147 592,317 630,493 3,121,286 
OpVaR99.9  (b) 4,211,260 6,877,495 4,086,106 4,116,113 19,290,974
Capital charge (b-a) 3,556,931 5,633,348 3,493,789 3,485,620 16,169,688
OpVaR99.9  / EL ratio (b/a) 6.44 5.53 6.90 6.53 6.18 
 
The “Mean” and “OpVaR” rows report the mean and 99.9% percentile of annual aggregate losses 
computed by simulating 20,000 years of losses for each cell. The mean is taken as the proxy for 
the Expected Loss (EL). In our case, we assume that the bank’s pricing scheme integrates the 
Expected Loss so that the regulatory capital charge reduces to the Unexpected Loss, which is the 
difference between OpVaR99.9 and EL. 
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Table 7: Spearman’s rank correlation matrix for the selected cells  
 
 Cell(1,1) Cell(1,2) Cell(2,1) Cell(2,2) 
Cell(1,1) 1.000    
Cell(1,2) 0.209 1.000   
Cell(2,1) 0.668 0.039 1.000  
Cell(2,2) -0.307 0.110 -0.645 1.000 
 
This table provides the Spearman’s rank correlation between the four selected cells. Spearman’s 
rank correlation (ρS) between two random variables X and Y is defined 
as ( ) ( ) (( YFXFYX YXS ,, ))ρρ = , where ρ is the traditional Pearson’s correlation coefficient. 
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Table 8: Comparison of total capital charges  
 
Method Expected Loss OpVaR99.9 Capital Charge Base 100
BIA  - - 17,877,462 125 
SA   - - 14,301,970 100 
AMA (Basel II default) 4,436,968 21,952,325 16,169,688 113 
AMA (real dependence #1) 4,382,481 16,537,021 12,154,540 85 
AMA (real dependence #2) 4,361,659 13,354,638 8,992,979 63 
AMA (independence) 4,378,761 12,038,990 7,660,229 54 
 
In this table, the reference capital charges obtained by the Basic Indicator Approach (BIA) and 
Standardized Approach (SA) are based on Basel II definition. “Basel II default” assumes full 
positive dependence between risks; “real dependence #1” refers to the observed dependence 
between business lines and full positive dependence between loss event type (intra-business lines); 
“real dependence #2” refers to the observed dependence between the four cells; “independence” 
assumes no correlation between cells. The last column reports the ratio of the capital charge 
obtained from each model to the capital charge derived from the Standardized Approach. 
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Table 9: Comparison of distributions obtained with or without external data  
for Cell (1,2) 
 
Data used beyond cut-off threshold 
Internal data only Internal and external data 
LB Estimate UB LB Estimate UB 
Real Total Loss  792,349   792,349  
Median  884,729   1,333,948  
Mean (=EL) 1,048,846 1,244,147 1,712,263 471,595 1,562,793 2,360,613
OpVaR95 3,018,060 3,398,271 
(+173.1%)
4,229,647 1,925,822 3,040,296 
(+94.5%) 
3,902,967
OpVaR99 4,241,718 4,744,537 
(+39.6%)





6,645,258 3,532,582 4,694,103 
(+8.0%) 
5,620,977
OpVaR99.9 5,939,985 6,877,495 
(+25.4%)
8,249,290 4,533,070 5,774,601 
(+23.0%) 
6,920,889
OpVaR99.95 6,441,825 7,253,584 
(+5.5%) 




This table presents estimates and the lower and upper bounds of 90% confidence intervals of the 
OpVaR for the Cell (1,2). The fitted distributions are a Negative Binomial (660, 0.476) for the 
frequency and the severity distribution is the combination of a Weibull (4,42, 0.094) for “ordinary” 
losses (from the collection threshold up to the cut-off threshold U = 537), a GPD (994; 1.412) for 
“large” losses (from U = 537 upwards). When including external data, the extreme threshold is 
21,170 and a lognormal (12.37, 1.58) is used for “external” losses (above E = 21,170). Percentage 
increases with respect to the previous cell are shown between parentheses. To compute the 
confidence intervals, a bootstrap technique is applied: the severity distribution is fitted on a 
random sub-sample whose size is 90% of the original sample. The frequency distribution is a 
Negative Binomial (654, 0.459) for all iterations. The procedure is repeated 250 times. 
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Table 10: Operational RAROC  
 
 RAROCO 
Business line Default AMA Corrected AMA 
Asset management 3.73% - 
Retail banking 3.13% - 
TOTAL 3.48% 6.89% 
 
In this table, the RAROCO figure represents the value of the operational risk adjusted return on 








opop −=  when the revenues corresponding to 
operational risk (GIop) are set equal to the gross operating margin of the business line (14% in our 
case). “Default AMA” corresponds to the default dependence assumption of Basel II (aggregation 




Table 11: Impact of managerial actions on regulatory capital 
 
 Dashboards Audit Tracking  
 (1,1) (1,2) (2,1) (2,2) (1,1) (1,2) (2,1) (2,2)  
Frequency x  15 15 15 12 - 12 - 12  
Severity y - - - - - 5 - 5  
Expected Loss 13.0 10.7 12.7 18.6 - 12.4 - 23.5  
Unexpected Loss 8.4 8.6 2.3 1.6 - 10.6 - 13.1  
Reg. Capital (by cell) 8.3 8.5 1.9 0.6 - 10.4 - 11.7  
Reg. Capital (by BL) 8.4 1.1 5.2 5.3  
Reg. Capital (total) 4.7 5.8  
 
This table reports the changes in (input) frequency and severity parameters and (output) loss and 
capital measures consecutive to a 15% reduction in the total expected loss. All elements of this 
table are expressed as percentage reductions. 
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Table 12: Impact of actions on profitability 
 
 Default AMA Dashboards Audit tracking 
Business Line RAROC A.C. RAROC A.C. RAROC A.C. 
Asset Mgmt 3.73% - 7.30% 1.48% 10.31% 2.28% 
Retail Banking 3.13% - 6.78% 0.36% 9.34% 0.59% 
TOTAL 3.48% - 7.08% 0.61% 9.95% 0.98% 
 
In this table, the RAROCO figure represents the value of the operational risk adjusted return on 








opop −=  when the Expected Loss (EL) is set equal 
to 14% of the Gross Income (GI) corresponding the operational risk. “A.C.” means “Acceptable 
Cost” and represents the percentage amount of gross income generated by the business line that is 







                                                           
Footnotes 
1 Operational risk is defined by the Revised Framework of the International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (hereafter Basel II) as the “risk of loss resulting from 
inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events. This definition 
includes legal risk, but excludes strategic and reputational risk.” (BCBS, 2004). 
2 In order to comply with Basel II, “a bank’s internal measurement system must reasonably 
estimate unexpected losses based on the combined use of internal and relevant external loss data, 
scenario analysis and bank-specific business environment and internal control factors.”  The model 
presented here is limited to the first two elements, as integrating subjective elements such as 
experts’ opinions in the actuarial model goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
3 Available upon request. 
4 An alternative model could be used to fit the severity distribution, e.g., a compound distribution 
including adependence structure between ordinary and large losses. To our knowledge, there is no 
decisive evidencethat strongly favors such a model over ours (that is, a mixture of the 
corresponding mutually exclusivedistributions). Both choices can be supported by sound 
arguments. We chose to select our model because the actuarial models on which LDA is built 
assume that individual losses are jointly independent within one specific risk type.  
Indeed, the aggregated loss distribution is obtained through the n-fold convolution of the severity  
distribution with itself (n being the random variable of the frequency process), thus implicitly 
assuming independently distributed losses.  
5 We choose the MSE criterion because it explicitly accounts for both the bias and inefficiency 
effects (see Theil, 1971). 
6 As noted in the final Accord, “A bank (…) must use relevant external data (…), especially when 
there is reason to believe that the bank is exposed to infrequent, yet potentially severe, losses.” 
(BCBS, 2004, § 674).. 
7 One could think of relevant measures different from size (such as location, business mix, 
governance and corporate controls) that might distinguish the financial institutions from others in 
the external database. However, such measures are not always readily available in public database. 
8 While formal comparison with other copulas is beyond the scope of this study, we have also used 
Clayton, Frank and Gumbel copulas and capital charge estimates were similar to the one obtained 
with the mixture copula.    
9 Applying such a linear scaling does not affect the interpretation of the results. 
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10 These distributions are classical candidates, although other specifications could obviously be 
considered as well. It is important to remember that these distributions are used to fit the body of 
the severity distribution and are thus bounded towards the upper side. Distinction between a 
heavy-tailed distribution such as Pareto and a thin-tailed distribution such as Weibull is therefore 
less relevant in this case as fitted data are not characterized by rare and severe losses. 
11 We assume here that the bank’s pricing scheme integrates the Expected Loss so that the capital 
charge is only the Unexpected Loss. Basel II indeed requires banks “to calculate its regulatory 
capital requirement as the sum of expected loss (EL) and unexpected loss (UL), unless the bank 
can demonstrate that it is adequately capturing EL in its internal business practices.” (BCBS, 
2004). 
12 We only examine the possibility of serial autocorrelation across weekly loss amounts, showing 
that this serial autocorrelation within operational risks is not statistically significant, However  
studies suggest the existence of a cyclical component inherent in operational risk, such that 
operational losses are correlated with external elements, such as economic conditions and business 
cycles. See Allen and Bali (2005) for details. 
13 In our context of strictly positive random variables following a highly skewed distribution, the 
use of a non-parametric indicator of dependence such as the Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficient seems more appropriate than Pearson’s product-moment coefficient (see Embrechts et 
al., 2002). 
14 While formal comparison with other copulas falls outside the scope of this study, we have also 
used Clayton, Frank and Gumbel copulas in additional experiments. Capital charge estimates were 
very similar to the one obtained with the mixture copula. The total capital charges were all within 
a [+3%; -5%] range from the value obtained with the copula used in this study.  
15 Indeed, the SA derives the capital charge by simply applying a given factor (called “beta”) 
ranging from 12 to 18% to each business line’s gross income. The business lines considered in this 
study have the lowest beta factor (12%). Thus the total capital charge computed by the SA is 
particularly attractive in this case. 
16 Several techniques exist to include these factors in the overall framework: “adjustment 
functions” applied to the regulatory capital charge obtained with LDA, or “weighted” approaches 
to combine soft assessment (i.e., based on opinions or indicators) with pure statistical results from 
internal data inspection, etc. 
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